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 SQL injection (SQLi), a well-known exploitation technique, is a serious risk 
factor for database-driven web applications that are used to manage the core 
business functions of organizations. SQLi enables an unauthorized user to get 
access to sensitive information of the database, and subsequently, to the 
application’s administrative privileges. Therefore, the detection of SQLi is 
crucial for businesses to prevent financial losses. There are different rules 
and learning-based solutions to help with detection, and pattern recognition 
through support vector machines (SVMs) and random forest (RF) have 
recently become popular in detecting SQLi. However, these classifiers ensure 
97.33% accuracy with our dataset. In this paper, we propose a deep learning-
based solution for detecting SQLi in web applications. The solution employs 
both correlation and chi-squared methods to rank the features from the 
dataset. Feed-forward network approach has been applied not only in feature 
selection but also in the detection process. Our solution provides 98.04% 
accuracy over 1,850 recorded datasets, where it proves its superior efficiency 
among other existing machine learning solutions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The versatility of the internet raises the expectations of its user by offering limitless information and 
connectivity. Most businesses, therefore, reshape their existing organizational and commercial processes into 
internet-based solutions, i.e. web applications, to reach its targeted audience. Web applications provide 
different modes of user engagement in the system so that businesses can observe stakeholders’ need for the 
product(s) and can offer them customized deals. All critical business information is stored in the application’s 
database whereby owners or the system can make the appropriate decision for action. Therefore, ensuring the 
security of the stored data is a vital responsibility of the system’s designer/developer.  
However, a large number of web applications are developed without following the secured 
convention of software development [1]. As a result, web systems are vulnerable to different kinds of cyber-
attacks [2]. According to the IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index, 79% of malicious incidents result from 
injection attacks. The number of injection attacks has increased 37% in 2017 compared to 2016 [3]. Also, 
since 2010 injection attacks have been at the top of the list of web application attacks, according to the Open 
Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [4,5]. These attacks can cause huge financial and reputational 
losses to business organizations [6–13]. 
An SQLi attack occurs due to SQLi vulnerabilities of web applications, which lead the intruder to 
perform an attack [14,15]. Such attacks mostly occur due to a lack of proper validation of inputs of web 
applications [16–23]. The OWASP’s records from 2010 to 2017 reveal the carelessness of web developers 
about good practices for developing web applications. 
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Fig. 1 shows an approach to checking SQLi vulnerability. When there is an escape string, i.e., single 
quotation, backslash, etc. at end of the URL, it needs also to be at the end of the SQL query generated for the 
URL, which makes the SQL query a form of payload. 
 
Figure 1. SQLi vulnerability check of a web application. 
 
Records in the database correspond to the SQL query generated against the web application’s URL. 
A query with a single quote at the end is unknown to the database for any records it contains. Therefore, this 
forces the database to throw exceptions from which the SQLi vulnerability of a web application can be 
known. After analyzing the exceptions, attackers try to inject several malicious SQL queries to get access to 
secured confidential information. 
The following example explains the processes showed in fig. 1 that how SQLi vulnerability can be 
disclosed by converting a simple SQL query which is produced from a URL to a payload.  
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10 
 
Let the above URL a targeted web application to be checked SQLi vulnerability. 
After adding a single quotation at the end of URL it looks like, 
http://www.example.com/product.php?id=10' 
 
This generates a http request to the web application’s server and the predefined SQL query for this 
URL tries get executed with the single quotation 
SELECT * FROM products WHERE id_product=$id_product 
//This query is to be executed 
 
For the single quotation with the SQL query the database throws an error/exception as there is a 
syntactic mistake in the SQL query. 
Warning: mysqli_fetch_array() expects parameter 1 to be mysqli_result, bool given in 
/nfs/c05/h02/mnt/83231/domains/example.com/html/product.php on line 67 
From this error/exception an attacker gets fingerprinting information and a determination that this 
web application builder might not follow all the coding conventions. 
There are numerous SQLi detection approaches to diminish such attacks through SQLi vulnerability 
exploitation. These detection approaches can be of various types: detection using pattern matching [24-32], 
learning-based detection [33-43], and other approaches [44-49]. 
 
1.1. Pattern Matching Approaches 
Pattern matching approaches are mostly focused on comparing a predefined benign SQL query with 
the SQL query generated at the runtime. Anything extra coming with the SQL query at the runtime is 
considered as an injection attempt. 
The papers [24-32] use pattern matching approaches to detect and prevent SQLi attacks. These 
operations are performed at the runtime, which makes these practices time-consuming and complex. Wahid 
Rajeh and Alshreef Abed have proposed a three-tier method [24]. In their architecture, they use several types 
of operations to detect and prevent SQLi attacks. But their method seems costly and time-consuming. Mao 
Chenyu and Guo Fan [25] have proposed an intention-oriented approach to detect and prevent SQLi attacks. 
At the runtime they check every SQL query corresponding to their SQL intention description language, 
which is then converted into deterministic finite automata. Thereafter, it is checked if the request is for an 
SQLi attack or not. C. Shi et al. [26] proposed a self-learning SQLi detection approach with a pattern 
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matching and feature-filtering method. They generated a tree of selected SQL syntaxes to make a pattern and 
use that pattern to identify SQLi attacks. D. Kar et al. [27] developed a tool called SQLiDDS, which they 
used to transform particular portions of the SQL query into plain text and compared it with the runtime SQL 
query. Inyong Lee et al. [28] proposed a method for SQLi detection where the method removes the value of 
an SQL query attribute of web pages when a user submits parameters; it then compares the query with the 
predetermined query. A. Ghafarian [29] proposed a hybrid model where they monitored the execution of all 
incoming SQL queries dynamically and performed string matching between the received query and their 
expected query. Then they compared the result of the string matching process with the valid SQL query to 
identify SQLi attacks. In their proposed model, R.P. Karuparthi and B. R.P. Karuparthi and B. Zhou [30] 
proposed a dynamic query matching technique where they compared the executed runtime SQL query with a 
sanitizer, SQL master file then with predefined threshold value respectively to detect SQLi attack. The result 
is then sent to the approximate matching algorithm for analysis. A. Kumar and S. Binu [31] proposed a 
method where they made a set of tokens with the SQL query and matched them with user input at the runtime 
to detect SQLi attacks. N. Lambert and K. S. Lin [32] broke down various portions of the legal SQL query 
and used it in comparison with the user-defined SQL query to identify SQLi attacks. 
 
1.2. Learning-based approaches 
Learning-based approaches focus on studies to detect SQLi wherein solutions based on machine 
learning are used to solve the problems. Nowadays, learning-based approaches perform better than traditional 
rule-based approaches. Rawat and Shrivastav [33] proposed a detection approach based on SQL injection 
performable query tokenization [32] using a support vector machine (SVM). Kamtuo and Soomlek [34] 
inspected queries that could be used to perform SQLi, and they defined some specific conditions to produce a 
dataset in order to detect SQLi vulnerability in a web application. They compared various machine learning 
algorithms and received the best performance with the decision jungle algorithm. Zhuang Chen et al. [35] 
constructed a dictionary using the selected keywords from SQL injectable queries and HTTP requests, where 
the Word2vector algorithm was used to extract dataset from the dictionary. They also selected SVM as a 
learning algorithm to predict SQLi vulnerability. Shar and Tan [17] achieved above 85% prediction accuracy 
on SQLi and cross site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in different web applications using WEKA [36]. They 
implemented a tool named “PhpMinerI” to extract data by static analysis. Hua et al. [37] used statistical 
features and existing security knowledge to extract the features of SQLi attack requests. They proposed a 
web attack detection technology using SVM. Joshi and Geetha [18] used blank separation and query 
tokenization to prepare a dataset of SQLi detection features. They used a Naive Bayes algorithm to perform 
the detection operation. Moises et al. [38] analyzed the criteria of SQLMap to detect the frequencies of 
keywords and non-alphabetic characters used in SQLi. They used Naive Bayes and decision tree classifiers to 
classify SQLi attacks. D. Das et al. [39] indexed the strings of dynamic SQL queries and employed SVM to 
classify a runtime SQL query as normal or an attack attempt. Y. Wang and Z. Li [40] generated a parse tree 
of SQL queries, analyzed HTTP request parameters, and used them to compare with another parse tree. They 
used an SVM classifier to detect SQLi attempts. Other learning-based studies also found for phishing 
detection of web applications using features extraction methods.Sahingoz et al. [110] proposed a language-
independent real-time anti-phishing system containing seven different algorithms for classification and NLP-
based features to detect phishing websites. Kasim [111] introduced an approach that evaluated a phishing 
event using the classification of deep-hybrid features accompanied by the Light Gradient Boosted Machine 
model as soon as the web address entered the address bar. Yang et al. [112] proposed a deep learning-based 
fast phishing detection approach focusing on the multidimensional features. Lakshmi et al. [113] suggested a 
unique approach to discovering phishing websites where the hyperlinks exist in the HTML page's source 
code in the corresponding website. Basitet al. [114] reviewed various phishing attack detection techniques 
based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) to evaluate the qualities and shortcomings of the given methodologies.    
 
1.3. Other Approaches 
C. Ping [41] used the second-order SQLi to bypass the protection provided to web applications. 
They proposed adding random numbers to the selected keywords of executed queries to detect and prevent 
SQLi attacks. B.D. Priyaa and M. I. Devi [42] collected a query tree from database logs and extracted SQLi 
vulnerability features. They used an efficient data-adapted decision tree (EDADT) and binary SVM to 
effectively distinguish between SQLi attacks and normal SQL requests. P. Li et al. [43] proposed an SQLi 
attack detection technique that analyzes the user’s interaction with the web application. They analyzed the 
user’s log of web applications to find out the criteria of SQLi attacks and applied them to their model. A. 
Ciampa et al. [16] developed a tool to inspect SQLi vulnerability of web applications. K. Kemalis and T. 
Tzouramanis [44] proposed a technique where they extracted some syntactical structures of SQL queries of a 
web application and filtered runtime SQL queries based on those structures to detect SQLi attacks. V. 
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Shanmughaneethi and S. Swamynathan [45] proposed syntactic verification with XML and error message 
customization for SQLi attack detection. 
Thus, researchers sought to detect and prevent SQLi attacks with either traditional rule-based 
approaches or machine learning-based approaches, while some worked with other approaches. However, no 
studies have so far used deep learning-based approaches in an SQLi attack scenario. Moreover, all the 
researchers focused on the SQL query, but no one considered the features of a web application to deal with 
SQLi attacks. 
SQLi refers to the result of formidable threat to security and privacy concern for both client and web 
application. These threats become possible for not abiding the proper development conventions [1,30] by the 
developers which imposes the state of weakness of a web application. Lack of those conventions produce 
errors that provide information [29,30] about the technologies of that web application. Operators in SQL 
queries by which attackers can operate an attacking expedition to a web application are used to fuel learning 
based SQLi detection [34,35,38]. Payloads through user inputs [31] and clicking behavior [43] on different 
parts of a web application can also lead to SQLi attack.  
In view of the above, it can be perceived that SQLi attack can be performed through different types 
of strategies and various parts of a web application. Those strategies and different parts together can be called 
web application’s features by which a proper implication of the SQLi attacks can be delineated. 
Among the types of SQLi detection solutions discussed earlier learning based approaches have 
become very popular due to its precision in detection problems. By this time shallow architectures such as 
Support Vector Machine (SVM), Naive Bayes are being used widely in various detection and classification 
problems. However, these architectures have their limitations which can produce problems in their respective 
ways. Some relatable drawbacks of SVM are, it is time and memory consuming [46-52], complexity in 
choosing right kernel function [51-54], high algorithmic complexity [50-52] and inability to work with 
massive data [55]. Independence assumption [47,51,56,57], sometimes providing bad results with large 
dataset [47,57] and sometimes providing good results with large dataset [48,50,58], these are relatable 
drawbacks of Naive Bayes. And for that, works done by other researchers on this issue might not provide 
very accurate results. Besides, deep learning is another learning based solution which has a very good 
reputation over other learning based solutions [59,60]. Moreover, deep learning based solutions have been 
shown providing better results than other learning based approaches [59-65] including SVM and Naive 
Bayes. 
Aiming the above problem, this paper proposed a technique to detect web application's SQLi 
vulnerability based on various web features using deep learning. This technique focuses on web features that 
could be involved in sensitive data disclosing or can lead to unauthorized access to the database of a web 
application. Those web features have been elected after analysis of the responses resulted from various 
actions of SQLi on web applications. Moreover, appearances of the name of these web features in scholarly 
articles on SQLi increases the assessment of those features. 
The contributions of the present study are as follows: 
● A dataset with 19 SQLi vulnerability features has been produced using manual penetration, testing 
the following double-blinded testing strategy. 
● A deep learning-based approach has been used to detect SQLi vulnerabilities. 
 
The rest of the document is organized as follows: 
Section II describes the overall architecture of our SQLi vulnerability detection framework and also 
tells how the framework works in detail. Section III shows the experimental results and presents the ultimate 




2. PROPOSED MODEL 
Fig. 2 shows the proposed model of SQLi vulnerability detection using a Feedforward Neural 
Network. The model is designed to find SQLi vulnerability focusing on predefined rules and deciding 
whether a web application is vulnerable or not. It describes the extraction, processing, and optimization of 
datasets. It uses feature selection methods along with the feed-forward neural network to bring the dataset 
into the best result-producing state. Finally, the neural network model is utilized to predict the SQLi 
vulnerability of the target web application with the dataset. 
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Figure 2. Proposed model of SQLi vulnerability detection. 
 
Features are engineered on the basis of the logical conditions of SQL procedures and web 
applications usability facilities. Those features are used to perform data collection by checking every aspect 
of all the particular web applications. Hence, real web data related to SQLi have been acquired and with them 
some data which are generated based on real data have been combined to get an operational dataset. Those 
features then preprocessed by some predefined processing techniques and then feature selection methods 
have been applied to get the final dataset. After that, that dataset has been sent to perform the classification 
operation from which a decision can be taken about a particular web application. 
From a user’s perspective, the SQLi vulnerability detection processes using our model have the 
following steps: 
(1) The user will take the desired web address of a web application and put it to a script written in 
Python. 
(2) The user will be directed to the web application that could be vulnerable to SQLi. Basically, this 
web application is test data. 
(3) The script will start processing to extract the features of the test data (current web application) and 
save them in a data structure. 
(4) At this stage, to guess the type of the web application, the implemented model will be activated 
based on predefined rules learned from previous data collected from other web applications. To 
predict the types of the test data, the rules of the classifier are utilized.  
(5) After the prediction operation, a warning will signal if the web application is vulnerable to SQLi; 
otherwise, that web application will be marked as benign. 
 
The following sections explain the methodologies used for building the proposed framework. The 
framework supports the prediction model in such a way that it can predict the web application’s SQL 
injection vulnerability. The technique used for SQL injection vulnerability detection and prediction, and the 
neural network model, research methods, and plan are described. 
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2.1. Formal definitions of dataset 
As it has been said earlier, this paper focusing on web application's various features that can put a 
web application at risk and no state-of-art has been given an eye on that issue, implies a new dataset 
construction using the web features. That dataset consists of data found with practical testing on various web 
applications to maintain efficiency and precision. Based on those real life data some dummy data was created 
to prevent data inadequacy for the operation of deep learning models. Those data have been combined and 
went through some processing techniques to increase the integrity of the dataset. 
Definition 1: D denotes the dataset, while Cj denotes a class in the dataset. 
Definition 2: FeatureValue refers to the feature name and feature value. Feature name and value are denoted 
as (Fi, fi). 
Definition 3: The nth row in the dataset D refers to a set of lists of feature values, which can be denoted as 
(Fn1,fn1),….,(Fnk,fnk). 
Definition 4: FeatureValueSet refers to a set of disjoint attribute values contained in a row as a training case, 
denoted as {(Fi1,fi1),….(Fik,fik)}. 
Definition 5: {antecedent, C} denotes the form of a rule item r in the D, where the antecedent refers to 
FeatureValueSet and C refers to the class. 
Definition 6: A single rule belonging to a class is represented as antecedent → C, where the antecedent 
refers to FeatureValueSet and C refers to the class. 
 
Table 1. Dataset Sample 
Instance Number Attr1 Attr2 Attrn Class 
1 F1 F2 Fn C0 
2 F1 F4 Fn C0 
3 F3 F7 Fn C1 
4 F5 F6 Fn C1 
5 F2 F5 Fn C0 
 
2.1.1. Feature Extraction for SQLi Vulnerability 
  The extraction process has been executed in this study to find out the essential features in order to 
detect SQL vulnerability in a web application based on the previous literature. These features help the 
proposed model to classify the given weakness of any web application effectively and efficiently. In this 
study, 19 different features have been used to determine the class of vulnerability. These features are 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.1.2. Selected features 
The following subsection presents the features used in our detection operation, as well as their 
corresponding rules. 
(1) Input Validation: Unvalidated input points of a web application offer an easy way to inject malicious 
SQL code in order to get access to confidential information [16-23]. 
Rule: If inputs are validated → Legit 
                      else → Suspicious 
 
(2) Parameter Tampering: Parameters are used to identify records in the database. Tempering parameters 
provides exceptions when no records in the database can be identified [16,18,20,21,51]. 
Rule: If parameter temperable → Suspicious 
                     else → Legit 
 
(3) Exception Handling: Exceptions are reactions of the databases when faulty SQL requests are sent to it. 
The database can disclose its SQLi vulnerability through exceptions [66]. 
Rule: If exceptions handled → Legit 
                  else → Vulnerable 
 
(4) Use of parameterized query: The existence of parameters in query refers to a particular record in the 
database. Tempering with parameters raises exceptions [21,22,67,71]. 
Rule: Existence of parameter → Suspicious 
                  else → Legit 
 
(5) Visibility of Page Extension: The visibility of page extension denotes that the possible web 
technologies have been used in the web application [68]. 
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Rule: Existence of page extension → Suspicious 
                   else → Legit 
 
(6) Illegal Input Acceptance: The acceptance of illegal inputs allows injecting any type of malicious 
codes that bypass the security logics of the database [21,69]. 
Rule: Acceptance of illegal inputs → Vulnerable 
                   else → Legit 
 
(7) Error Controlling: Not controlling fatal errors in the web application and the database can increase 
chances of attack to the web application [16,21,23,72]. 
Rule: Controlling error → Legit 
                  else → Suspicious 
 
(8) DB Info Disclosing: Database info helps attackers to find the drawbacks of a particular database 
technology [70-74]. 
Rule: Disclosing DB info → Suspicious 
                   else → Legit 
 
(9) SQL Version Disclosing: The limitations of a specific SQL version can disclose exploitable 
vulnerabilities [23,71,75]. 
Rule: Disclosing SQL version → Suspicious 
                    else → Legit 
 
(10) Guessable Table/Column Name: Gaining access to private information would become easier if an 
attacker could guess the table/column name of the database [76,77]. 
Rule: If easy to guess table column name → Suspicious 
                    else → Legit 
 
(11) Directory Readability: An attacker can collect internal information if the directory can be read to 
perform a SQLi attack [73]. 
Rule: If directories readable → Suspicious 
                 else → Legit 
 
(12) Allowing Null Byte: Force the application to minimize exceptions to continue the execution of 
malicious query [78]. 
Rule: Allows null byte → Suspicious 
                  Else → Legit 
 
(13) Proper Implementation of Firewall Rules: Find out the level of secured firewall being used to 
protect the database as well as the web application [43]. 
Rule: Rule: If firewall implemented → Legit 
            else → Suspicious 
 
(14) Trust Intruders: Make decisions about whether the system allows suspicious activities or not [21]. 
Rule: Trust intruders → Suspicious 
             else → Legit 
 
(15)  Use of Real Escape String: Deny the execution of SQL queries containing escape strings [47,79]. 
Rule: Escape string uses → Legit 
              else → Vulnerable 
 
 
(16) Parameter Encoding: Sometimes developers try to block SQL query execution by encoding the 
parameter [21,72]. 
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Rule: Encoded Parameter → Legit/Suspicious 
            else → Legit/Suspicious 
 
(17) Encoding Data while Taking Input: Encoding user inputs can be used to defend against SQLi 
attacks [21,72]. 
Rule: If inputs are encoded → Legit/Suspicious 
                       else → Legit/Suspicious  
 
(18)  Execution of Malicious Code: If any kind of malicious code is executable in a web application, then 
it must be in serious danger [16,21,23,71]. 
Rule: If can execute malicious code → Vulnerable 
                               else → Legit 
 
(19) SQL Server Info: An attacker can exploit the system’s database based on SQL server information 
[71,73]. 
Rule: Gaining SQL server info → Suspicious 




We have used inconsistency reduction, handling null value, and data standardization to preprocess 
the data. These techniques are commonly used to ensure the integrity of data in a dataset.  
 
2.2.1. Inconsistency Reduction 
Several types of inconsistencies have been discussed in the previous literature [80-82]. They cause 
serious problems in the dataset and come in the way of right decision-making, thereby decreasing usability 
[83]. Bonding between sets of data has a weakening effect and results in an undesired state of the dataset, 
which defines the question of integrity. To counter this problem, other researchers [82, 84-86] have used 
various techniques and mechanisms. Inconsistent data may lead to an inaccurate training accuracy in the 
model.  
 
2.2.2. Missing Value Reduction 
In data preprocessing, missing values remain a concern to the researchers because it spoils the 
efficiency of data in the dataset and forces the classification algorithms to produce unreliable and 
insubstantial results [87-89]. It could make features biased as well as hamper the desired output from the 
dataset [90]. Steps to handle this problem have been discussed on [89-92].  
 
2.2.3. Data Standardization 
The data processing technique converts the structure of an unbalanced dataset to a common data 
format, known as data standardization [93, 94]. It improves the quality of attributes in the dataset and 
prevents an attribute from dominating [96]. Data standardization transforms data from the dataset after the 
data is pulled from the source and before it is loaded into the model for training. Sometimes some features in 
the dataset influence the training process and make accuracy biased [93-95]. 
 
2.3. Feature Selection 
Correlation coefficient and chi-square feature selection methods have been used to have a better 
understanding of the features. These feature selection methods were chosen because of their model 
independency. Correlation helps to find out the relationship between features, because highly correlated 
features can influence the training of the model and lead to biased prediction [97-99]. The chi-square method 






2.4. Deep Learning for SQLi Vulnerability Classification 
The deep learning model has been chosen for the prediction operation because it gives best-in-class 
performance in solving classification problems. In recent years researchers have had a good success rate in 
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solving detection problems using deep learning [59-65]. The deep learning model used in this paper contains 
19 input neurons with one hidden layer. The activation functions used in the model are a rectified linear unit 
(ReLU) in the first layer and a sigmoid in the second layer. A formal description of the used neural network 
is provided below. 
Let n be the neural network, ln = {1,2,3} a layer in the n neural network, xn the input to the 
corresponding n neural network, i(ln) the incoming inputs to the layer ln, rn the output of the layer ln, w(ln) the 
weights of the layer ln, b(ln) the biases of the layer ln, f the activation function (ReLU) in the layer ln, and o the 
function in the output layer (Sigmoid). The equation of the feed-forward operation of the neural network is as 
follows: 
 
r(0n) = x          (1) 
 i(ln+1) = w(ln+1) + b(ln+1)        (2) 
 r(ln+1) = f(r(ln+1)) = max(0,r(ln+1))       (3) 
r(3) = o(r(3)) = 1/(1+e-(r(3)))        (4) 
The predefined labels for the inputs are determined as shown in Equations (5) and (6). L defines the 
predefined labels of inputs, and L0 defines the predicted label result.  
{𝑟(3) ≥ 0.5, 𝐿 = 1   𝑟(3) < 0.5, 𝐿0 = 0                                                                                                                     (5) 
      
During the training process, the used neural network model is tuned to minimize the value of the 
loss function, i.e. cross-entropy function. The loss function is described as follows: 




(𝑖) + (1 − 𝐿(𝑖)) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (1 − 𝐿0
(𝑖))                                                                        (6) 
 
2.5. Regularization 
In the case of neural network model training, overfitting is one of the major problems. An overfitted 
neural network with a particular train set cannot generally be used in classification. In the neural model of 
this research, dropout regularization [104] is used to avoid the overfitting problem. Dropout is a technique to 
skip some units of the neural network during the training operation. The incoming and outgoing connections 
of some neurons are removed, and during this the probability remains fixed. It prevents the neural network 
model from becoming too dependent on a specific set of units and their associated weights and biases. In this 
research the neural network is modeled with the dropout rate of 0.2. This rate is generally used in typical 
neural network-based models. 
 
2.6. Validation 
The overfitting problem discussed in the section on regularization can also be solved by cross 
validation. Here, K-fold cross validation [105] has been used to validate the efficiency of data in the dataset, 
as well as to make the training process effective. K-fold cross validation is a technique to use the dataset as a 
validation set by splitting the whole dataset into equal folds with the random selection of samples. During the 
validation process, one fold is randomly selected for test operation, while the rest is taken for training 
operation. This process is repeated until all the folds are used as test and training sets. This ensures traversing 
through all the data in a dataset and helps to have a good understanding of the dataset used in the model. The 
dataset in this research was split into several folds with 30 samples in each fold. 
The novelty of the work includes creating a new dataset by extracting 19 SQLi features after 
observing the state-of-the-art literature and conducted black-box manual penetration testing to verify the 
legitimacy of the records. Feedforward Neural Network classification algorithm has been nominated to detect 
SQLi injection vulnerability where it uses both correlation coefficient and chi-square method for selecting 
features to increase its accuracy. 
 
3. EVALUATION 
3.1. Experimental Environment 
  We used a Windows 10 computer with Intel Core i3-5005U CPU, integrated GPU, and 4GB RAM 
to deploy our proposed model. We implemented the module of the model in Python. Most of the modules 
were executed on the CPython Interpreter [106]. The feed-forward neural network modeling tool was 
implemented using the Keras library [107]. Scikit-learn [108] and Tensorflow [109] were also utilized to 
implement the clustering and other machine learning algorithms. 
 
3.2. Correlation of input attributes 
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Linear correlation is used to identify correlations between 19 input attributes of 1,850 SQL injection 
vulnerabilities and to find samples containing a dataset in the neural network. After finding the correlation 
among 19 features, iteration has been performed based on the correlation range of -1 to 1, using the score 
obtained from the correlation operation. In each phase of the iteration, the neural network has been trained 
using the reduced features based on the correlation range value to see which features are effective to detect 
the vulnerability. The iteration continues until the best accuracy is acquired. Fig. 3 shows the reduced 
features and the correlation heatmap between them. 
 
Figure 3. Visualization of correlated features. 
 
3.3. Chi-square of correlated input attributes 
The chi-square feature selection method is applied to the features reduced by correlation to find out 
the significance level of the features shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Figure 4. Plot describing chi-square level of significance. Each plot refers to a particular attribute and shows 
how important they are to the classification operation. 
 
No samples were reduced during this process. After applying chi-square, the same type of iteration 
has been done as in the correlation operation to identify important features. This time the iteration is 
performed based on the chi-square value of significance. Table 1 summarizes the reduced features and their 
significant values. 
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Table 2. Extracted features and the value of importance from Fig. 5 
Attributes Chi-square scores Significance 
Input validation 288.256 Significant 
Parameter tampering 334.047 Significant 
Exception handling 409.634 Significant 
Use of parameterized queries 5.68944 Not significant 
Visibility of page extension 4.19805 Not significant 
Illegal input acceptances 290.574 Significant 
Error controlling 510.157 Significant 
DB info disclosing 440.99 Significant 
SQL version disclosing 420.94 Significant 
Guessable table/column name 297.471 Significant 
Directory readability 0.000650201 Not significant 
Allowing null byte 78.2139 Significant 
Trust intruders 348.714 Significant 
Use of real escape string 28.6231 Not significant 
Parameter encoding 5.63055 Not significant 
Encoding data while taking input 33.3797 Significant 
Execution of malicious code 377.44 Significant 
 
3.4. Model validation 
Model validation refers to the integrity and reliability of the neural network model. A validated 
model ensures a better acceptance of classification results. The used model was validated based on a 
comparison of the results of regularization and validation. Both suggest that the model is reliable to use in 
this scenario. 
 
3.5. Deep learning model accuracy 
The supervised dataset was split into 90% for testing and 10% for testing. The neural network used 
500 epochs with a batch size of 30. The network was randomly initialized. With 17 input attributes from 
correlation and chi-square with more than 1,500 samples, the neural network model obtained 98.22% 
accuracy (Fig. 4). The loss of model (Fig. 5) denotes how bad the model is. The model sustained very little 
loss. Hence, it can be said that the model is close to accuracy. 
 
Table 3. Comparison with other classifiers 
Learning Process Accuracy 
SVM 94.66% 
Random forest 97.33% 
Naive Bayes 84.49% 
Proposed Method (NN) 98.04% 
 
Table 3 compares the different classifiers used in this research to check if any other machine 
learning algorithm can better result from the neural network. Here, an SVM, random forest, and Naive Bayes 
with an accuracy of 94.66%, 97.33%, and 84.49%, respectively, have been used because these were used by 
other researchers discussed in the learning-based approach in the section on related work. However, in this 
research, the neural network has provided the best performance with an accuracy of 98.04%.    
 
Table 4. SQLi Vulnerability Detection Accuracy Comparison 
 
Literatures Accuracy 
Shar and Tan [17] 85.00% 
Joshi and Geetha [18] 93.30% 
Rawat and Shrivastav [33] 96.47% 
Lei and Shen [37] 93.30% 
Lodeiro-Santiago et al. [38] 97-98% 
Proposed Method (NN) 98.04% 
 
Table 4 shows the SQLi vulnerability accuracy compared with the other five models. We found that 
85.00%, 93.30%, 96.47%, 93.30%, and 97-98% accuracy obtained by the models of Shar and Tan [17], Joshi 
and Geetha [18], Rawat and Shrivastav [33], Lei and Shen [37], and Lodeiro-Santiago et al. [38], 
respectively. However, our proposed model ensured 98.04% accuracy. 
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Figure 5. Adeptness of model at gaining accuracy.     Figure 6. Adeptness of model at sustaining less loss. 
 
Figs. 5 and 6 depict model training accuracy and loss, respectively. The determination of the 
training process can be visualized from these plots. The good accuracy shown in Fig. 4 has been due to the 
iteration performed. The model training loss shown in Fig. 5 is very low as we know less loss leads to good 
accuracy. 
 
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The objective of this paper has been to propose the framework of SQL injection vulnerability 
detection of a web application using deep learning by extracting various vulnerability finding points of the 
web application. In this paper, primarily the deep learning part is described since it is the core of the section 
on SQL injection vulnerability prediction. More than 1,850 samples of injection vulnerability with selected 
features are sent through a neural network model for prediction. The system delivers a performance accuracy 
of 98.04%, which is better than that provided by existing systems. Future experiments should focus on 
building an automated tool and an effective way to prevent SQL injection. 
 
APPENDIX A 
Data Collection Algorithm 
An algorithm has taken place to perform the data collection operation against every feature. A 
python based technology has been used to build a tool which takes a particular web application and checks 
whether the predefined conditions of the features set meet or not. If the checking works according to the 
conditions then the data collection operation takes place. An overview of the algorithm has been given below 
for better understanding, 
 
Input Feature Existance Based Data Collection 
Input:       Predefined feature set:F_set, URL, url_feature 
Output:    Input feature existence based data 
1:  Input_feature ← [0 | 0 | … | 0]  
2:  index ← 0  
3: if valid ← URL then 
4:  for ∀f1 ∈ F_set do // for all features in feature set  
5:  if f1 ∈ url_feature then  
6:  Input_feature[index] ← 1  




Vulnerable Feature Dataset 
Feature Datatype Category Impact 
Input Validation Boolean User input Severe 
Parameter Tampering Boolean User Input Severe 
Exception Handling Boolean Error/Exception Severe 
Use of parameterized query Boolean User input Low 
Visibility of Page Extension Boolean URL lookup Low 
Illegal Input Acceptance Boolean User input Severe 
Error Controlling Boolean Error/Exception Severe 
DB Info Disclosing Boolean Footprinting/Fingerprinting Severe 
SQL Version Disclosing Boolean Footprinting/Fingerprinting Severe 
Guessable Table/Column Name Boolean Unsecure coding convention Severe 
Directory Readability Boolean Unsecure coding convention Low 
Allowing Null Byte Boolean Unsecure coding convention Moderate 
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Proper Implementation of Firewall Rules Boolean Unsecure coding convention Moderate 
Trust Intruders Boolean Unsecure coding convention Severe 
Use of Real Escape String Boolean Unsecure coding convention Moderate 
Parameter Encoding Boolean Encryption Low 
Encoding Data while Taking Input Boolean Encryption Moderate 
Execution of Malicious Code Boolean User input Severe 




[1] A. Sadeghian, M. Zamani, and A. A. Manaf, “A Taxonomy of SQL Injection Detection and Prevention 
Techniques,” 2013 International Conference on Informatics and Creative Multimedia, 2013. 
[2] K. Gupta, “A Survey On Web Application Attack Detection Methods,” International Journal of Advanced 
Research in Computer Science, vol. 8, no. 7, pp. 565–569, 2017. 
[3] “IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index | IBM.” [Online]. Available: https://www.ibm.com/security/data-
breach/threat-intelligence. [Accessed: 27-Apr-2021]. 
[4] “Open Web Application Security Project | OWASP.” report 2017. Available: 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2017-Main. [Accessed: 27-Apr-2021] 
[5]  “Open Web Application Security Project | OWASP.” report 2010. Available: 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2010-Main. [Accessed: 27-Apr-2021] 
[6] “Questions for TalkTalk | BBC News.” October 26, 2015. Available: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
34636308. [Accessed: 27-Apr-2021] 
[7] “US man stole 130m card numbers | BBC News.” August 18, 2009. Available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8206305.stm. [Accessed: 27-Apr-2021] 
[8] “RockYou Hacker: 30% of Sites Store Plain Text Passwords | New York Times.” December 16, 2009. Available:  
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/external/readwriteweb/2009/12/16/16readwriteweb-rockyou-
hacker-30-of-sites-store-plain-text-13200.html. [Accessed: 27-Apr-2021] 
[9] “Yahoo reportedly hacked: Is your account safe? | CBS News.” July 12, 2012. Avaiable: 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/yahoo-reportedly-hacked-is-your-account-safe/. [Accessed: 27-Apr-2021] 
[10] “Hackers Breach 53 Universities and Dump Thousands of Personal Records Online | New York Times.” October 
3, 2012. Available: https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/03/hackers-breach-53-universities-dump thousands-of-
personalrecordsonline/?mtrref=en.wikipedia.org&gwh=220D0829194985857B41F9E177E05436&gwt=pay&asse
tType=REGIWALL. [Accessed: 27-Apr-2021] 
[11] “Anti-U.S. Hackers Infiltrate Army Servers | Information week.” May 28, 2009. Available: 
https://www.informationweek.com/architecture/anti-us-hackers-infiltrate-army-servers/d/d-id/1079964. 
[Accessed: 27-Apr-2021] 
[12] “Russian Hackers Amass Over a Billion Internet Passwords | New York Times.” Aug. 5, 2014. Available: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/technology/russian-gang-said-to-amass-more-than-a-billion-stolen-internet-
credentials.html?_r=0. [Accessed: 27-Apr-2021] 
[13] “SQL Injections Continue to Embarrass Big Names | EconoTimes.” May 9, 2017. Available: 
https://www.econotimes.com/SQL-Injections-Continue-to-Embarrass-Big-Names-690349. [Accessed: 27-Apr-
2021] 
[14] D. Scott and R. Sharp, “Abstracting application-level web security,” Proceedings of the eleventh international 
conference on World Wide Web - WWW 02, 2002. 
[15] J. Abirami, R. Devakunchari, and C. Valliyammai, “A top web security vulnerability SQL injection attack — 
Survey,” 2015 Seventh International Conference on Advanced Computing (ICoAC), 2015. 
[16] A. Ciampa, C. A. Visaggio, and M. D. Penta, “A heuristic-based approach for detecting SQL-injection 
vulnerabilities in web applications,” Proceedings of the 2010 ICSE Workshop on Software Engineering for 
Secure Systems - SESS 10, 2010. 
[17] L. K. Shar and H. B. K. Tan, “Mining input sanitization patterns for predicting SQL injection and cross site 
scripting vulnerabilities,” 2012 34th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE), 2012. 
[18] A. Joshi and V. Geetha, “SQL Injection detection using machine learning,” 2014 International Conference on 
Control, Instrumentation, Communication and Computational Technologies (ICCICCT), 2014. 
[19] K. Wei, M. Muthuprasanna, and S. Kothari, “Preventing SQL injection attacks in stored procedures,” Australian 
Software Engineering Conference (ASWEC06), 2006. 
[20] Y. J. Tian, Z. M. Zhao, and H. C. Zhang, “Second-order SQL Injection Attack Defense Model,” Netinfo Security, 
2014. 
IJEEI ISSN: 2089-3272  
 
SQL Injection Vulnerability Detection Using Deep Learning… (Md. Maruf Hassan et al) 
715 
[21] A. Tajpour, M. Massrum, and M. Z. Heydari, “Comparison of SQL injection detection and prevention 
techniques,” 2010 2nd International Conference on Education Technology and Computer, 2010. 
[22] L. Qian, Z. Zhu, J. Hu, and S. Liu, “Research of SQL injection attack and prevention technology,” 2015 
International Conference on Estimation, Detection and Information Fusion (ICEDIF), 2015. 
[23] Priyanka, and V. K. Bohat, “Detection of SQL Injection Attack and Various Prevention strategies,” International 
Journal of Engineering and Advanced Technology (IJEAT) Vol. 2, Issue 4, April 2013. 
[24] W. Rajeh and A. Abed, “A novel three-tier SQLi detection and mitigation scheme for cloud environments,” 2017 
International Conference on Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (ICECOS), 2017. 
[25] M. Chenyu and G. Fan, “Defending SQL injection attacks based-on intention-oriented detection,” 2016 11th 
International Conference on Computer Science & Education (ICCSE), 2016. 
[26] Z. Z. Zhang, Q. Y. Wen, and Z. Zhang, “An Improved Approach for SQL Injection Vulnerabilities 
Detection,” Applied Mechanics and Materials, vol. 263-266, pp. 3017–3020, 2012. 
[27] D. Kar, S. Panigrahi, and S. Sundararajan, “SQLiDDS: SQL Injection Detection Using Query Transformation and 
Document Similarity,” Distributed Computing and Internet Technology Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 
377–390, 2015. 
[28] I. Lee, S. Jeong, S. Yeo, and J. Moon, “A novel method for SQL injection attack detection based on removing 
SQL query attribute values,” Mathematical and Computer Modelling, vol. 55, no. 1-2, pp. 58–68, 2012. 
[29] A. Ghafarian, “A hybrid method for detection and prevention of SQL injection attacks,” 2017 Computing 
Conference, 2017. 
[30] R. P. Karuparthi and B. Zhou, “Enhanced Approach to Detection of SQL Injection Attack,” 2016 15th IEEE 
International Conference on Machine Learning and Applications (ICMLA), 2016. 
[31] A. Kumar and S. Binu, “Proposed Method for SQL Injection Detection and its Prevention,” International Journal 
of Engineering & Technology, vol. 7, no. 2.6, p. 213, 2018. 
[32] L. Ntagwabira and S. L. Kang, “Use of Query tokenization to detect and prevent SQL injection attacks,” 2010 3rd 
International Conference on Computer Science and Information Technology, 2010. 
[33] R. Rawat and S. K. Shrivastav, “SQL injection attack Detection using SVM,” International Journal of Computer 
Applications, vol. 42, no. 13, pp. 1–4, 2012. 
[34] K. Kamtuo and C. Soomlek, “Machine Learning for SQL injection prevention on server-side scripting,” 2016 
International Computer Science and Engineering Conference (ICSEC), 2016. 
[35] Z. Chen, M. Guo, and L. Zhou, “Research on SQL injection detection technology based on SVM,” MATEC Web 
of Conferences, vol. 173, p. 01004, 2018. 
[36] I. H. Witten and E. Frank, Data Mining. Burlington: Elsevier, 2005. 
[37] J. Lei and X.-Q. Shen, “A new method for edge detection based on support vector classification,” Proceedings. 
International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics. 
[38] M. Lodeiro-Santiago, C. Caballero-Gil, and P. Caballero-Gil, “Collaborative SQL-injections detection system 
with machine learning,” Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Internet of Things and Machine 
Learning, 2017. 
[39] D. Das, U. Sharma, and D. K. Bhattacharyya, “Rule based Detection of SQL Injection Attack,” International 
Journal of Computer Applications, vol. 43, no. 19, pp. 15–24, 2012. 
[40] Y. Wang, and Z. Li, “SQL Injection Detection with Composite Kernel in Support Vector Machine,” International 
Journal of Security and its Applications 6(2), pp. 191–196, April 2012. 
[41] C. Ping, “A second-order SQL injection detection method,” 2017 IEEE 2nd Information Technology, 
Networking, Electronic and Automation Control Conference (ITNEC), 2017. 
[42] B. D. Priyaa and M. I. Devi, “Hybrid SQL injection detection system,” 2016 3rd International Conference on 
Advanced Computing and Communication Systems (ICACCS), 2016. 
[43] P. Li, L. Liu, J. Xu, H. Yang, L. Yuan, C. Guo, and X. Ji, “Application of Hidden Markov Model in SQL 
Injection Detection,” 2017 IEEE 41st Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC), 
2017. 
[44] K. Kemalis and T. Tzouramanis, “Sql-Ids,” Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Applied computing - 
SAC 08, 2008. 
[45] V. Shanmughaneethi, “Detection of SQL Injection Attack in Web Applications using Web Services,” IOSR 
Journal of Computer Engineering, vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 13–20, 2012. 
[46] P. Chhabra, R. Wadhvani, and S. Shukla, “Spam Filtering using Support Vector Machine,” International Journal 
of Computer and Communication Technology, pp. 256–261, 2010. 
[47] S. R. Pakize, and A. Gandomi, “Comparative study of classification algorithms based on MapReduce model,” 
International Journal of Innovative Research in Advanced Engineering (IJIRAE), 1(7), pp. 251-254, 2014. 
[48] S. Archana, and K. Elangovan, “Survey of classification techniques in data mining,” International Journal of 
Computer Science and Mobile Applications, 2(2), pp. 65-71, 2014. 
                ISSN: 2089-3272 
IJEEI, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2021:  702 – 718 
716 
[49] H. Maldonado, L. Leija, and A. Vera, “Selecting a computational classifier to develop a clinical decision support 
system (CDSS),” 2015 12th International Conference on Electrical Engineering, Computing Science and 
Automatic Control (CCE), 2015. 
[50] S. S. Nikam, “A comparative study of classification techniques in data mining algorithms,” Oriental journal of 
computer science & technology, 8(1), pp. 13-19, 2015. 
[51] M. Y. Asr, M. M. Ettefagh, R. Hassannejad, and S. N. Razavi, “Diagnosis of combined faults in Rotary 
Machinery by Non-Naive Bayesian approach,” Mechanical Systems and Signal Processing, vol. 85, pp. 56–70, 
2017. 
[52] A. S. Subaira and P. Anitha, “Efficient classification mechanism for network intrusion detection system based on 
data mining techniques: A survey,” 2014 IEEE 8th International Conference on Intelligent Systems and Control 
(ISCO), 2014. 
[53] R. Senthilkumar and R. K. Gnanamurthy, “Performance improvement in classification rate of appearance based 
statistical face recognition methods using SVM classifier,” 2017 4th International Conference on Advanced 
Computing and Communication Systems (ICACCS), 2017. 
[54] T.-T. Dai and Y.-S. Dong, “Introduction of SVM Related Theory and Its Application Research,” 2020 3rd 
International Conference on Advanced Electronic Materials, Computers and Software Engineering (AEMCSE), 
2020. 
[55] S. Chen, J.-Q. Wang and H.-Y. Zhang, “A hybrid PSO-SVM model based on clustering algorithm for short-term 
atmospheric pollutant concentration forecasting,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 146, pp. 41–
54, 2019. 
[56] O. A. ., “Comparative Study Of Classification Algorithm For Text Based Categorization,” International Journal of 
Research in Engineering and Technology, vol. 05, no. 02, pp. 217–220, 2016. 
[57] B. K. Bhavitha, A. P. Rodrigues, and N. N. Chiplunkar, “Comparative study of machine learning techniques in 
sentimental analysis,” 2017 International Conference on Inventive Communication and Computational 
Technologies (ICICCT), 2017. 
[58] I. A. A. Amra and A. Y. A. Maghari, “Students performance prediction using KNN and Naïve Bayesian,” 2017 
8th International Conference on Information Technology (ICIT), 2017. 
[59] Y. Shi, Y. Sagduyu, and A. Grushin, “How to steal a machine learning classifier with deep learning,” 2017 IEEE 
International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 2017. 
[60] A. Korotcov, V. Tkachenko, D. P. Russo, and S. Ekins, “Comparison of Deep Learning With Multiple Machine 
Learning Methods and Metrics Using Diverse Drug Discovery Data Sets,” Molecular Pharmaceutics, vol. 14, no. 
12, pp. 4462–4475, 2017. 
[61] W. C. F. Mariel, S. Mariyah, and S. Pramana, “Sentiment analysis: a comparison of deep learning neural network 
algorithm with SVM and naϊve Bayes for Indonesian text,” Journal of Physics: Conference Series, vol. 971, p. 
012049, 2018. 
[62] R. Moraes, J. F. Valiati, and W. P. G. Neto, “Document-level sentiment classification: An empirical comparison 
between SVM and ANN,” Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 621–633, 2013. 
[63] M.-Y. Day and Y.-D. Lin, “Deep Learning for Sentiment Analysis on Google Play Consumer Review,” 2017 
IEEE International Conference on Information Reuse and Integration (IRI), 2017. 
[64] A. Koutsoukas, K. J. Monaghan, X. Li, and J. Huan, “Deep-learning: investigating deep neural networks hyper-
parameters and comparison of performance to shallow methods for modeling bioactivity data,” Journal of 
Cheminformatics, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017. 
[65] G. Klambauer, T. Unterthiner, A. Mayr, and S. Hochreiter, “DeepTox: Toxicity prediction using deep 
learning,” Toxicology Letters, vol. 280, 2017. 
[66] W. G. J. Halfond and A. Orso, “Preventing SQL injection attacks using AMNESIA,” Proceeding of the 28th 
international conference on Software engineering - ICSE 06, 2006. 
[67] A. Sadeghian, M. Zamani, and A. A. Manaf, “A Taxonomy of SQL Injection Detection and Prevention 
Techniques,” 2013 International Conference on Informatics and Creative Multimedia, 2013. 
[68] N. Salih and A. Samad, “Protection Web Applications using Real-Time Technique to Detect Structured Query 
Language Injection Attacks,” International Journal of Computer Applications, vol. 149, no. 6, pp. 26–32, 2016. 
[69] D. A. Kindy, and K. P. Al-Sakib, “A Survey on SQL Injection Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Prevention 
Techniques,” IEEE 15th International Symposium on Consumer Electronics 2011. 
[70] M. Howard and D. L. Blane. “Writing Secure Code,” Vol. II. Microsoft Press, Redmond, Washington, 2003. 
[71] S. San-Tsai, W. H. Ting, L. Stephen , and L. Sheung, “Classification of SQL Injection Attacks,” University of 
British Columbia, Term Project, 2007. 
[72] J. P. Singh, “Analysis of SQL Injection Detection Techniques,” Theoretical and Applied Informatics, Vol. 28, No. 
1–2, 2017. 
IJEEI ISSN: 2089-3272  
 
SQL Injection Vulnerability Detection Using Deep Learning… (Md. Maruf Hassan et al) 
717 
[73] C. Anley, “Advanced SQL Injection in SQL Server Applications, white paper Next Generation Security 
Software,” 2002.  
[74] D. Litchfield, “Director of Security Architecture. Web application dissembly with odbc error message,” a report.  
[75] P. Kaur, and K. P. Kour, “SQL injection: Study and augmentation,” 2015 International Conference on Signal 
Processing, Computing and Control (ISPCC), 2015. 
[76] K. Kemalis and T. Tzouramanis, “Sql-Ids,” Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Applied computing - 
SAC 08, 2008. 
[77] X. Ping-Chen, “SQL injection attack and guard technical research,” Procedia Engineering, vol. 15, pp. 4131–
4135, 2011. 
[78] C. Victor, “Advanced SQL injection,” OWASP Foundation, April 2005. 
[79] L. K. Shar, and H. B. K. Tan, “Defeating SQL Injection,” Computer, 46(3), pp. 69–77, March 2013. 
[80] D. Zhang, “Inconsistencies in big data,” 2013 IEEE 12th International Conference on Cognitive Informatics and 
Cognitive Computing, 2013. 
[81] E. Cabrio, J. Cojan, and F. Gandon, “Mind the Cultural Gap: Bridging Language-Specific DBpedia Chapters for 
Question Answering,” Towards the Multilingual Semantic Web, pp. 137–154, 2014. 
[82] G. Bingham, B. Yip, M. Ferguson, and C. Nansalo, “MORPH-II: Inconsistencies and Cleaning,” University of 
North Carolina Wilmington NSF REU, 2017. 
[83] M. C. Rendleman, J. M. Buatti, T. A. Braun, B. J. Smith, C. Nwakama, R. R. Beichel, B. Brown, and T. L. 
Casavant, “Machine learning with the TCGA-HNSC dataset: improving usability by addressing inconsistency, 
sparsity, and high-dimensionality,” BMC Bioinformatics, vol. 20, no. 1, 2019. 
[84] T. Martins, and J. C. dos Reis, “Mechanism for inconsistency correction in the DBPedia Live,” Technical report, 
Universidade Estadual de Campinas-UNICAMP, 2019. 
[85] P. Pernot, and F. Cailliez, “A critical review of statistical calibration/prediction models handling data 
inconsistency and model inadequacy,” AIChE Journal, 63(10), pp. 4642–4665, 2017. 
[86] S. Sathya, and A. Rajesh, “Enhanced Hybrid Data Preprocessing Technique for Eliminating Inconsistencies in the 
Diabetic Dataset to Improve Mining Results,” Journal of Computational and Theoretical Nanoscience, Vol. 15, 
No. 6–7, pp. 1999–2002(4), June 2018. 
[87] R. Sridevi, and Dr.S. Priyaa, “An Ensemble approach on Missing Value Handling in Hepatitis Disease Dataset,” 
International Journal of Computer Applications, Vol. 130, No.17, November 2015. 
[88] M. Juhola, and J. Laurikkala, “Missing values: how many can they be to preserve classification reliability,” 
Artificial Intelligence Review, 40(3), pp. 231–245, 2011. 
[89] J. Watada, C. Shi, Y. Yabuuchi, R. Yusof, and Z. Sahri, “A Rough Set Approach to Data Imputation and Its 
Application to a Dissolved Gas Analysis Dataset,” Third International Conference on Computing Measurement 
Control and Sensor Network (CMCSN), 2016. 
[90] J. Kaiser, “Dealing with missing values in data,” Journal of systems integration 5(1), pp. 42–51, 2014. 
[91] M. Priyakshi, G. A. Choudhury, and T. Dey, “An Effective Method to Estimate Missing Value for Heterogonous 
Dataset.” International Journal of Knowledge Based Computer Systems, 6(2), pp. 8–22, December 2018. 
[92] Z. Maciej, “Service-Oriented Medical System for SupportingDecisions with Missing and Imbalanced Data,” IEEE 
Journal of Biomedical and Health Informatics, Vol. 18, No. 5, SEPTEMBER 2014. 
[93] I. B. Mohamad and D. Usman, “Standardization and Its Effects on K-Means Clustering Algorithm,” Research 
Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology, vol. 6, no. 17, pp. 3299–3303, 2013. 
[94] N. Bigdely-Shamlo, T. Mullen, C. Kothe, K.-M. Su, and K. A. Robbins, “The PREP pipeline: standardized 
preprocessing for large-scale EEG analysis,” Frontiers in Neuroinformatics, 9, p. 16, 2015. 
[95] C. Cabanes, A. Grouazel, K. V. Schuckmann, M. Hamon, V. Turpin, C. Coatanoan, F. Paris, S. Guinehut, C. 
Boone, N. Ferry, C. de Boyer Mont ́egut, T. Carval, G. Reverdin, S. Pouliquen, and P. Y. Le Traon, “The CORA 
dataset: validation and diagnostics of in situ ocean temperature and salinity measurements,” Ocean Science, 9(1), 
pp.1–18, 2013. 
[96] J. F. Girres, and G. Touya, “Quality Assessment of the French OpenStreetMap Dataset,” Transactions in GIS, 
14(4), pp. 435–459, 2010. 
[97] A. Wosiak, and D. Zakrzewska, “Integrating Correlation-Based Feature Selection and Clustering for Improved 
Cardiovascular Disease Diagnosis,” Complexity, pp. 1–11, 2018. 
[98] M. Doshi and S. K. Chaturvedi, “Correlation Based Feature Selection (CFS) Technique to Predict Student 
Perfromance,” International journal of Computer Networks & Communications, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 197–206, 2014. 
[99] A. H. Mark, “Correlation-based Feature Selection for Machine Learning,” Department of Computer Science, The 
University of Waikato. 
[100] C. Jin, T. Ma, R. Hou, M. Tang, Y. Tian, A. Al-Dhelaan, and M. Al-Rodhaan, “Chi-square Statistics Feature 
Selection Based on Term Frequency and Distribution for Text Categorization,” IETE Journal of Research, vol. 61, 
no. 4, pp. 351–362, 2015. 
                ISSN: 2089-3272 
IJEEI, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2021:  702 – 718 
718 
[101] B. S. Otong, H. M. Kusnadi, and N. Oky Dwi, “Feature selection based on chi square in artificial neural network 
to predict the accuracy of student study period,” International Journal of Civil Engineering and Technology 
(IJCIET), Vol. 8, Issue 8, pp. 731–739, August 2017. 
[102] C. Selvaraj, N. Bhalaji, and K. S. Kumar, “Empirical study of feature selection methods over classification 
algorithms,” International Journal of Intelligent Systems Technologies and Applications, vol. 17, no. 1/2, p. 98, 
2018. 
[103] S. Deysarakar and S. Goswami, “Empirical Study on Filter based Feature Selection Methods for Text 
Classification,” International Journal of Computer Applications, vol. 81, no. 6, pp. 38–43, 2013. 
[104] N. Srivastava, G. Hinton, A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and R. Salakhutdinov, “Dropout: a simple way to prevent 
neural networks from overfitting,” Journal of machine learning research, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 1929–1958. 
[105] R. C. Sharma, K. Hara, and H. Hirayama, “A Machine Learning and Cross-Validation Approach for the 
Discrimination of Vegetation Physiognomic Types Using Satellite Based Multispectral and Multitemporal 
Data,” Scientifica, vol. 2017, pp. 1–8, 2017. 
[106] R. V. Guido and B. D. Jelke, “Interactively Testing Remote Servers Using the Python Programming Language”, 
CWI Quarterly, Volume 4, Amsterdam, pp. 283–303, Issue 4 (December 1991). 
[107] François C. and others, Keras, 2015. Available: https://github.com/keras-team/keras 
[108] F. Pedregosa, G. Varoquaux, A. Gramfort, V. Michel, B. Thirion, O. Grisel, M. Blondel, P. Prettenhofer, R. 
Weiss, V. Dubourg, and others, “Scikit-learn: Machine learning in Python.” Journal of machine learning research, 
12(Oct), pp. 2825–2830, 2011. 
[109] M. Abadi, P. Barham, J. Chen, Z. Chen, A.  Davis, J. Dean, M. Devin, S. Ghemawat, G. Irving, M. Isard, and 
others, “Tensorflow: A system for large-scale machine learning,” 12th USENIX Symposium on Operating 
Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI 16), pp. 265–283, 2016. 
[110] O. K. Sahingoz, E. Buber, O. Demir, and B. Diri, “Machine learning based phishing detection from URLs,” 
Expert Syst. Appl., vol. 117, no. January 2019, pp. 345–357, 2019, doi: 10.1016/j.eswa.2018.09.029. 
[111] O. Kasim, “Automatic detection of phishing pages with event-based request processing, deep-hybrid feature 
extraction and light gradient boosted machine model,” Telecommunication Systems, 2021, pp. 1-13. 
[112] P. Yang, G. Zhao, and P. Zeng, “Phishing website detection based on multidimensional features driven by deep 
learning,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, no. c, pp. 15196–15209, 2019, doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2892066. 
[113] L. Lakshmi, M. P. Reddy, C. Santhaiah, and U. J. Reddy, “Smart Phishing Detection in Web Pages using 
Supervised Deep Learning Classification and Optimization Technique ADAM,” Wireless Personal 
Communications, 2021, pp. 1-16. 
[114] A. Basit, M. Zafar, X. Liu, A. R. Javed, Z. Jalil, and K. Kifayat, “A comprehensive survey of AI-enabled phishing 
attacks detection techniques,” Telecommun. Syst., vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 139–154, 2021, doi: 10.1007/s11235-020-
00733-2. 
 
